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Elites of structurally differentiated systems are generally 
defined as the set of incumbents of thehicrhest positions of 
authority who are consequential for the collective decisions of 
the larger system. In local communities as in national societies 
the structurally differentiated subsystems are the institutional 
sectors like the economy, the polity or the cultural sector.
Seen from the perspective of the role prescriptions for the 
varying positions, authority relations are well-defined only with­
in organizations and not across them. Insofar as the local commun­
ity is constituted as a corporation, the city councillors and 
higher public bureaucrats can make decisions binding the community 
at large. They possess the final implementative resource of 
authority for the whole of the local community, and not only for one 
sector. When regarding only the role prescriptions of the normative 
system, then the incumbents of political positions are located at 
the center of the elite system.
The important point here is that an elite delineated by the 
positional approach is not just a set of persons but a normatively 
defined system with a structure of its own. To distinguish this 
structure from the structural models which I shall discuss later, 
the term "normative structure" will be used.
The above-given definition of an elite system has an important 
second element. The incumbents of authority positions must be in­
fluential in the decision making process. It is this second elemement 
which has caused almost all the problems in respect of an adequate 
operationalization of the otherwise well-defined elite concept.
The classical approach to solve this problem is to discuss the 
old-established question of what power really means, followed by 
a theory-guided decision of how to delimit the boundaries for the 
elite system. One solution was to ask knowledgeables about the 
power reputation of the original set of the positional elite and to 
modify this set accordingly. An alternative approach is to start 
with a sample of important issues and to delineate the elite as the 




























































































the decisional approach runs the risk of completely de-emphasizing 
the authority part of the elite definition. But since participating 
in decision processes is part of the role prescriptions of the 
integrative core of the normative structure, some overlap of the 
decision making elite with the positional elite seems unavoidable.
Laumann et al. (1980) distinguish three possiblities of specifying 
systems boundaries: The focus may be on actors, activities resp. 
events, or relationships. The positional elite is defined to actors, 
and additional information on the power reputation of the actors does 
not change this focus on them. The decision making elite is defined 
to issues. But when the original sample is composed of position 
holders who are asked about their participation in the resolution of 
certain issues, then, of course, the focus is primarily on actors 
again, and only secondarily on events.
The third possibility of defining system boundaries would be the 
focus on relationships; but this approach is not practised in elite 
research. One should not forget, however, that the other two approaches 
have implications for relations within the elite system. Thus, it is 
very likely that a joint involvement in a certain activity leads to 
communications between the respective actors. In addition, the 
positional elite is partly integrated by authority relations, even 
if one does not know in what way the normative structure constrains 
actual relationships.
Whenever one has applied one of the possible three focuses to 
specify the system boundaries, then a structural description of the 
resulting system is only meaningful in respect of the other two 
elements. "The choice of a definitional focus ... fixes certain 
features of the network while leaving the remaining features free to 
vary" (Laumann et al. 1980:8). Our structural description of an elite 
system should be based on networks of relationships within a well- 
defined set of elite actors.
The critical question is, what relations one best chooses for the 
purpose of describing an elite system. According to the definition 
of an elite system, collective decisions are processed by this system 




























































































of this process. This criterion applies to influence relations. Two 
approaches of studying influence will be compared in this paper. In 
the first approach, influence is measured only indirectly via commun­
ication about issues, and an appropriate structural concept for this 
type of relationship is that of a social circle. By an alternative 
approach influence is measured more directly via the dependence of 
the actors. We shall compare the social circles with the structurally 
equivalent positions within a network of dependence relations.
There doesn't exist anything like the "real elite" which can or 
cannot be found by different techniques. But different techniques have 
varying consequences for empirical findings. At the present stage of 
elite research it seems necessary to become more sensitive to these 
consequences and this can best be achieved by applying different 
models to the same data set.
The data of the following analysis are drawn from a restudy of 
the elite of Altneustadt, seven years after the original study of 
Laumann and Pappi (1976). First I shall describe how the positional 
elite was specified. In the next section, the social circle concept 
is applied to this elite and, in the fourth section, it will be compared 
with the alternative approach of grasping the power structure via 
dependence relations. In the concluding section, some implications 
of the results will be outlined with regard to the prevailing elite 
models, especially the pluralist and power elite model.
2. The Positional Elite
Altneustadt is a medium-sized German city with clearly different­
iated institutional sectors. As in the first study, the concept of 
institutional elites was used as starting point for delineating the 
elite system. Each sector has its own leadership positions and the 
set of all persons holding leadership positions form the positional 
elite.
The institutional elites are overlapping, because most of the elite 
members perform multiple leadership roles. We, therefore, defined 




























































































which ranked highest within the respective institutional sector.
With regard to the principle leadership position the mayor e.g. is 
considered to be a member of the political system; even if he does 
own a small factory.
The different institutional sectors were collapsed into the follow­
ing six categories: (1) the city and county administration, the city 
councillors and party representatives of the two major parties: the 
(2) CDU as the majority party and the (3) SPD as the opposition party, 
(4) the economic sector, (5) the sector of voluntary associations, 
and the (6) cultural sector with the leading personnel of the churches 
the Catholic Church being the dominant one - and the educational 
system. The first three groups are at the center of the normative 
structure .
"Sector experts" were asked which persons or positions were most 
important for community affairs. The less important persons were 
eliminated from the list. The starting population for the survey 
consisted of 83 persons.
These persons were distributed across the institutional sectors, 
as shown in Table 1. Being well-defined as incumbents of authority 
positions, these same people may not be identical with the most in­
fluential persons. Remember that the knowledgeables were only used 
as sector experts. Therefore, a power reputation question was 
asked during the interview. The selected 83 persons themselves are 
used as experts to assess the influence of their elite colleagues.
A list of the 83 position incumbents was presented with a request to 
identify those who are influential in Altneustadt.
This question generates a network of power perception among a 
closed set of people. The problem, of course, is whether the limits 
of the system defined by the researcher are also meaningful for the 
respondents. To present a list of position holders is a self-conscious 
act of the researcher to define a common frame of reference with the 
respondents. But given this frame of reference and a certain type of 
relationship, the respondents should have the possiblity to correct 
the list, if deemed necessary. Even if the target population is de­
lineated by characteristics of the nodes of the network, minor cor­




























































































T a b l e  1
The institutional affiliations (principle leadership positions) 





Nonresponse . . 1 )■ Additions Completed
Interviews
Public
Administration 7 2 1 6
CDU 12 - - 12
SPD 7 - 1
Economy 23 3 - 20
Voluntary
Associations 17 1 - 16
Culture 17 1 - 1 6
N 83 7 2 78




























































































of the relationship are taken into account by the respondents.
Our respondents were asked which influential persons they found 
missing on our list. Persons who received at least three nominations 
were added to the target population. According to Table 1, only two 
persons had to be supplemented to the surveyed population. With 
7 cases of non-response, mainly from the peripheral sectors, 78 in­
terviews could be completed.
3. The Local Elite as a Social Circle
Kadushin (1968:692) defines a social circle as a network of 
people sharing a common interest; the network allows for indirect 
communication links and the social circle is not supposed to be 
formally organized. The boundaries of a circle are not clearly 
recognizable and this causes some problems for the operationalization 
of the concept.
In an American and an Australian national elite study the authors 
operationalized the concept (cf. Moore 1978; Higley and Moore 1981). 
In both cases the starting population consisted of a sample of the 
positional elite which was supplemented by persons receiving at 
least three nominations as interaction partners or influential lead­
ers. The respondents from the original sample and the supplementary 
group were asked in which national issue debate they were involved 
in most. The discussion partners of this issue were recovered by some 
sociometric questions and formed, together with the respondents as 
choosers, the network to be analysed. In the American study the net­
work is composed of 480 respondents - out of 545 interviewees - and 
396 non-respondents and the Australian network has 363 choosers and 
383 chosen persons who were not included in the sample. The choosers 
could be selected, too, but it is remarkable how many people outside 
the sample received nominations. A list of the target population was 
not presented to the respondents and that may explain the recovery 
of a network with relatively open boundaries.
Social circles are parts of the larger network interconnected by 




























































































work are generated by communication and are treated as being sym­
metric. In the national elite studies a link is supposed to be 
present "if at least one individual in the pair reports talking 
to the other and absent if neither named the other as interaction 
partner" (Moore 1979:679). An alternative would be to take only 
reciprocated choices into account. The advantage of the weaker 
criterion is that non-respondents can be included in the network. 
Thus, for instance, two respondents may have an indirect link 
through a non-respondent who was nominated by both of them. The 
only problem is that direct links among the non-respondents are made 
impossible by the study design. These peripheral members of the net­
work cannot build up closely connected cliques among themselves.
The clique concept used are maximal complete subgraphs of direct­
ly connected nodes - at least three of them - which are identified 
in a first step by the COMPLT-algorithm developed by Alba (1972).
To allow for indirect links and yet guarantee large densities, those 
cliques are merged whose members overlap to a high degree. The cut­
off criterion, used in the national elite studies, was two-thirds. 
"When two-thirds or more of the members of a smaller group were also 
members of a larger group, the two groups were merged." (Moore, 1979: 
679) .
The typical result of a COMPLT analysis along these lines is the 
identification of a large central circle and of some smaller ones. 
This central circle is composed of 227 persons in the US and 418 
in Australia. This result is interpreted to mean that both national 
elites are highly integrated systems. Higley and Moore (1981) advance 
the new model of a consensually integrated elite for this type of 
situation.
It is sometimes argued that a snowball technique will naturally 
lead to the finding of an integrated network structure (cf. Laumann 
et al. 1980:8). Moore is eager to stress that this is not the case. 
Her main argument is that the different discussion topics which 
generate links could have led as well to a "finding of small, issue- 
based groups" (1979:677). But one could, of course, argue to the con­
trary that the merging of links, irrespective of discussion topics, 




























































































identifies a core region of persons active in several issue areas.
This is of no disadvantage for the procedure, because mediating be­
tween different issue publics is one of the principal functions of 
the integrative core of an elite system.
In our application of the social circle concept the respondent was 
not allowed to choose the discussion topic most important to him, 
but was asked to nominate his discussion partners for the four issues 
identified by the researchers. These issues had raised some con­
troversy in the community. They were selected in such a way that each 
institutional sector had at least one issue which especially touched 
upon its interests. In the resulting network a link is supposed to 
be present if a nomination was made by either dyad member for at 
least one issue.
Even if communication is intrinsically a symmetric relationship 
it makes a difference who addressed whom to exchange opinions or to 
influence the other partner. One implication of the normative elite 
structure is that the peripheral members have interests which they 
try to realize through contacts with the integrative core. Thus, one 
would assume that they address the integrative core more often than 
the other way round. To allow for this asymmetry the respondents 
were asked who initiated contact with them about a certain issue.
This was placed as an open question at the very beginning of the 
interview, before the list of the target population was presented.
The resulting asymmetric communication network contains 304 links, 
178 to the target population of 85 - the two supplementary persons 
were added here to the target population - and 126 to 85 persons 
outside. Judging from the way the question is asked it is not sur­
prising that the discussion of the major local issues is not re­
stricted to the positional elite or to the more influential persons.
We shall see whether centrality in the discussion network is at least 
a characteristic of the powerful.
In Table 2 the network is blocked according to the six instituional 
sectors, with two additional blocks of non-respondents who could be 
































































































P  a3i t - ro O CO V£)
3  <D vo 1--1 CO 2 2 o
G O G  






3  -P 2 CM 2 1--1 G O coCO 3  P  fl! O O O O O o - r̂CO 2 •H 0  i—1 • • • • • •
G G ta 50 3 i—l
<u 3 •p g a
2 2 3  3  0




O 0) -P o
G (U -H CM 1—1 O G O o i—l2 G hO -P O o O O o o t—
C O G 3 • • • •
3 2 cd i—i o
-P 3
CO 2




3 CM CM o o i—! oo1—1 P o O o o o o oocd (--1 • • • • • • •








G 3  3
•H CO P -H
«H G O Ln 1--1 CM 1—1 CM 1—I




M C r<~\ CM CM ir\
c o o o o o o o CO•H 2 G • • • • .i—1 CU O i—iP OG cd wO
•H •H — — — — —
CO P
CO o




•H 2 co 12 r - CO 2 2 2
G Q O o o o O O CO
-P O • • • • •
CD ■p"Ss
>5 c—1
CO 1 O O K"\ o V0 -p- p" 2
cd O «H -H 1—1 o o o o o 2
•H G -P • • • • • • •
Cm i—1 *H cd ro
O 2  E G
3  2  -P
CO G  <  C0
0) ■--------— — — —— — — — _ V _
•H CO
-p c G•H o OCO •H •HG p 2
D 3 3 CO
2 G •H 3P O 33 CO o Gx : •H CO 50
Eh G CO eu•H < 2CO e C
G >3 •H
O < G
-p >5 cd CD G
cd O E 2 G o
G •H O C 3•rH i—1 r~| 3 2 C
2 2 Q o 1--1 1--1 3
o 3 Q G O O 3 3





























































































and then 85 additional people outside, who received the above- 
mentioned 126 choices. The density measure is the ratio of the 
present links to the possible links.
The expectation that the core of the normative structure is more 
likely the target for communication attempts than the source of it 
is not corroborated by the data. The two parties and the administration 
are more often reported as initiators than the other elite groups.
This is partly due to their tendency to nominate other members of 
the integrative core of the normative structure as initiators. But 
apart from this tendency, the three groups of the integrative core 
nominate the other three groups of the positional elite less often 
as initiators than the other way round. Thus the integrative core 
is not only the main target for influence attempts but its major 
source, too, due to its higher activity level.
When we now try to identify social circles, all links will be 
treated as symmetric. The overall density of this symmetric network 
is still rather low (0.021), but one has to recollect that the non­
respondents could not choose each other. With this correction the 
density of the asymmetric network is 0.023 and that of the symmetric 
network 0.029.
Three social circles are identified, two small ones with 3 re­
spectively 4 members, and a larger one with 44 members. This larger 
one can be interpreted as the central circle of the Altneustadt 
elite. Viewed from the perspective of the normative structure one 
would expect public bureaucrats and politicians to be over-represented 
in the central circle, but that all sectors could send at least some 
spokesmen of their interests to this center.
As sh v/n in Table 3, the core of the normative structure is indeed 
over-represented in the central circle, but this same phenomenon 
applies to the other three institutional sectors of the positional 
elite, too. The most remarkable finding of Table 3 is that the SPD 
as the oppostion party in the city council is more over-represented 
in the central circle than either the public administration, the 




























































































T a b l e  3
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Peripheral members of the central circle have one or more con­
nections to central members, but they were not nominated unanimously 
by a clique of members. Otherwise they would be part of the central 
circle, too. The high proportion of non-respondents among the 
peripheral members is, therefore, not astonishing. Most of these 
persons received only one nomination, and if the nominator is 
a member of the central circle, the nominated non-respondent is 
automatically a peripheral member. When he is nominated by re­
spondents outside the central circle, then he becomes a non-member.
The central circle is indeed a relatively dense part of the larger 
network. Its internal density is 0.178, compared to a density of 
0.016 for the non-members. The diameter of 8 as the longest geodesic 
within the central circle, however, seems to be of a rather long 
distance for indirect communication.
In order to function as an integrative core the central circle 
should not be specialized to discuss only one special issue, but 
the scope of the current discussions should be broader than that of 
specialized interest groups. Whether a person is reported as being 
active in more than one issue debate is used as an indicator in this 
respect. The overall discussion network contains 170 nodes but 22 
of these are isolates. They are respondents who admitted that nobody 
had initiated discussions with them and who did not receive nominations 
as initiators either. Omitting these 22 persons, 54 are reported as 
being active in more than one issue debate and 94 only in one debate. 
This ratio of 0.57 becomes 2.38 for the members of the central circle.
The members of the central circle who were recruited from the 
positional elite are generalists to a higher degree than the members 
from outside the original target population. This latter group com­
prises 8 out of the 44 members of the central circle and these 
18 per cent may be regarded as a rather high percentage because the 
original population was identified quite carefully. But the criterion 
of having a reputation of being powerful is, of course, not the same 
as being active in political discussions. Quite characteristically,
6 out of the 8 outside members of the central circle are typical one- 




























































































and the nominations for the other two are spread quite unevenly 
across the issues, too. Thus, I conclude that the central circle 
of Altneustadt's elite does function as an integrative core for 
general political discussions. That this is not a specialized dis­
cussion for a few issues is mainly due to the most central members 
in this network who are incumbents of leadership positions. The 
leaders of both parties belong to this central group. But other 
members of the central circle are more specialized. The boundaries 
of the central circle appear to be as open as those of the discus­
sion network as a whole.
Higley and Moore use the number of nodes one can reach in one 
or two steps as an indicator of centrality in the discussion net­
works of American and Australian elites (cf. 1981:591 ). I computed 
the same measure for Altneustadt and shall compare the indicator 
with the indegrees of the power reputation network. This procedure 
will reveal the systematic differences between the alternative tech­
niques to operationalize elite systems.
4. The Power Elite in a System of Dependencies
As mentioned in the introduction, a direct approach to measure 
influence is to recover it from an interactor dependency matrix.
The more A is dependent on B, the more B can influence A, other things 
being equal. I interpret the network of power reputation as a proxy- 
measure of interactor-dependencies. When I am asked as a member of an 
elite system which of my colleagues are generally very influential, 
then my answers will recover not only the judgements of an external 
expert but that of a system member who reveals on whom he feels 
dependent. The local elite as a social system can be defined as a 
set of leaders who think of themselves as mutually dependent with 
regard to community politics.
Dependency is intrinsically an asy mmetric relationship. A can be 
more dependent on B than B on A. When the elite actors think of them­




























































































or indirect dependencies of varying sizes larger than zero exist.
The degree of dependency is measured only very crudely by the 
power reputation question. A respondent could or could not mention 
another elite member, depending on his personal threshold level. Even 
with this crude measure, there is no justification to symmetrize the 
matrix.
As previously mentioned, the respondents first had to choose 
their nominations from a list of the positional elite and were then 
allowed to supplement names which were not on the list. 24 additional 
people were nominated, two of them by three or more respondents.
These latter two were included into the target population, the other 
22 are non-respondents, of which two received two and 20 only one 
nomination. Only 6 out of these 22 were also named as discussion 
partners for the other network. Thenetwork of power reputation is, 
therefore, a relatively closed one, partly due, of course, to the 
list we presented. But it is also important that the frame of re­
ference of the researchers is accepted to a very high degree by 
the respondents.
The collapsed cliques of a social circle are a special structural 
model to analyse network data. According to Burt's distinction (1980) 
this is an example of a relational model, where the actors are ag­
gregated into groups when they entertain cohesive relations among 
themselves. An alternative would be a structural model where not only 
internal cohesiveness but also the pattern of relations to outgroups 
is taken into account. With such a positional model we can identify 
structurally equivalent actors within the total network. An example 
for this approach is the block model analysis developed by White et 
al. (1976).
The power structure model can be operationalized as a block of 
actors who are mutually dependent upon themselves and on whom the 
members of the larger elite system depend. By using a block model 
analysis I will look for a block of the power reputation network 
with high internal density and with an above average share of the 




























































































The 22 non-respondents outside the target population who received 
one or two power nominations will be included in the analysis. With 
the CONCOR-algorithm it is possible to start from a correlation of 
the columns or indegrees so that it is meaningful to include the 
non-respondents chosen by the respondents.
The result of the block model analysis shown in Table 4 is very 
clear. The densities in the first column are highest: this means 
that the first block is not only internally cohesive but is also per­
ceived as the most powerful by all other blocks. The members of this 
small group are not a random sample of the positional elite but are 
recruited from the top positions of the institutional sectors, with 
one important exception: There is not one leader of the oppostion 
party who is a member of the power elite. The membership composition 
is as follows: The three top public bureaucrats, three CDU leaders 
including the mayor, two owners of larger local business firms, two 
presidents of voluntary associations, and the incumbent of the 
highest local authority position of the Catholic Church.
The blocks are ranked from left to right according to their mean 
number of indegrees. This time, persons outside the targ-t population 
do only belong to the peripheral blocks.
It is remarkable how evenly the members of the central circle are 
distributed over the blocks. Even if the percentage of central 
circle members is highest for the power elite, one gets the impression 
that the two approaches aim at quite different power centers.
This difference between the two approaches can be studied more 
systematically when we compare the centrality of the elite members 
within the communication network with the indegrees of the same per­
sons in the power reputation network. One would expect powerful per­
sons outside the integrative core of the normative structure to be 
less well-connected in the communication network where routine 
politics are processed, whereas some very active and well-connected 
politicians may lack more substantial resources needed for their ad­
mittance to the inner circle of the powerful. These anticipated dis­
crepancies between the two measures will not be too extensive, because 





























































































T a b l e  4
Density Matrix of Power Reputation Blocks and 
Composition of Blocks
Nominator Nominated Blocks
Blocks 1 2 3 4 5 6
1 .364 .140 .131 .095 0 00 01 .043
2 .314 .074 .035 .037 .045 .026
3 .439 .126 .074 . 129 .063 .021
4 .426 .165 .139 .114 .063 .041
5 .193 .131 .073 .037 .035 .030
6 .294 .169 .093 .076 .122 .041
N 11 11 18 22 1 6 21 991}
in central 
circle •7/ 5 3 7 4 6 321)
not in^target 
population - - 1 3 9 9 22




























































































The measures were correlated for 184 persons, the union of the set 
of nodes of the power reputation and of the discussion network, and 
for 67 persons who form the intersection of elite members having indt ~ees 
larger than 1 in both networks. In Figure 1 the relationship is shown 
only for the intersection, that is the original target population, 
without the isolates in one or both of the two networks.
The overall correlation is a moderate r = 0.43 for the large group 
and an even smaller r = 0.33 for the intersection. These moderate to 
low correlations fit the general interpretation quite well that 
the two measures touch different aspects of influence. According to 
our expectation, the elite members with relatively more power re­
putation than centrality do not stem, with one exception, from the 
integrative core of the normative structure. Interestingly enough, 
the exception is the Landrat of the county of Diiren, whose office 
is outside the city of Altneustadt.
Among the well- connected relatively powerless persons the SPD
poi itici ans play a prominant role, wher eas for the CDU leaders power
reputat ion and communication centrality are more in line. Of the
9 persons ranking high on both imeasures , 5 are CDU leaders , 2 are
bus inessmen , one is the highest public bureaucrat of the city and
one is coded as a member of the sector of voluntary associ atiens,
even if one of his positions is that of FDP party leade r . The eli te
membe rs who rank 1ow on both measures stern mainly from the peri phera
sectors of culture and voluntary associ ations. Compared to these
two 1ess preminent sectors, the members of the economic sector
impede any attempt to classify them. They are quite evenly scattered
across the diagram •
When comparing the two measures one should not forget that a high 
rank on the power reputation scale depends solely on the answers of 
the other elite members, whereas high centrality can be a consequence 
of one's own name-dropping procedure. A person can become central 
because he himself nominates many other important persons. This is a 
consequence of the way in which the communication network is symme­
trized. The degree of centrality within the communication network 























































































































































































Can the elite system of Altneustadt be characterized as a con- 
sensually integrated elite or as a system dominated by a power 
elite? It would, of course, be very disappointing to learn that the 
answer is completely predetermined by the applied analysis strategy.
Higley and Moore characterize the consensually integrated elite 
as "an inclusive network of formal and informal communication, friend­
ship and influence-wielding among top position holders in all major 
elite groups ..." (1981:584). Because influence-wielding is not a 
symmetric relationship, I argue that the central circle of a general 
symmetric discussion network cannot be easily interpreted as an 
indicator of this type of an elite model. A central circle recovered 
from a general discussion network, fits in my opinion, the power 
imagery of the pluralists. The issue specific contents are lost be­
cause the different issue debates are collapsed into one general 
discussion. What remains is the everyday process of political dis­
cussion in a pluralist system devoid of deep cleavages.
Such a central circle can coexist with the power elite we identi­
fied. This group must not necessarily be united in its major policy 
options; it may function more like a clearing house for the interest 
of the different institutional sectors than as a closed group which 
can enforce its well co-ordinated politics upon the rest of the elite 
and the community at large. But this group is located at the apex of 
the power pyramid. If an elite is defined as consisting of positional 
leaders who are consequential for collective decisions, then one 
cannot do without a measure of dependency. The hierarchical aspect 
of dependency takes priority over the centrality aspect of commun­
ication .
A dependency relation between a pair of actors has only unambiguous 
consequences for a successful influence-wielding when there are no 
alternative relations. If the less powerful can realize his interest 
in alternative exchange relations in which both partners are power 




























































































Generally, one could argue that an analysis of the direct and indirect 
dependencies only makes sense for a well-bounded system where not 
every actor can look for outside alternatives. If a researcher is 
able to construct a relatively closed network he can recover 
the core of the elite system by applying the positional approach 
to a dependency matrix. If he cannot enforce clear boundaries, 
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